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Budget institutions and taxation 
 
 
Abstract 
While a number of different studies have explored the effects of budgetary procedures and the 
centralization of the budget process on government debt, deficits and spending, few of them have 
explored whether such fiscal institutions matter for public revenue. This article argues that 
centralizing the budget process raises the levels of taxation by limiting the ability of individual 
government officials to veto tax increases in line with common-pool-problem arguments regarding 
public finances. Using detailed data on budgetary procedures from 15 EU countries, the empirical 
analysis shows that greater centralization of the budget process increases taxation as a share of GDP 
and that both the type of budget centralization and level of government fractionalization matter for 
the size of this effect. The results suggest that further centralizing the budget process limits 
government debt and deficits by increasing public revenues as well as constraining public spending. 
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1. Introduction 
Interest has been growing in recent decades about how budget institutions—the procedures and 
rules that structure the process of preparing, enacting and implementing the public budget—affect 
government fiscal policy. Existing empirical contributions to that literature have focused primarily 
on developed democracies;1 but given the continuing concern with large government budget deficits 
and debt in many developed and developing countries, policymakers and researchers have turned 
their attention to how modified budget procedures might promote greater fiscal responsibility. Early 
attempts to do so include von Hagen and Harden (1995) and Alesina and Perotti (1996). 
 
Recent scholarship generally confirms that more hierarchical, centralized budget procedures limit 
public deficits and debt accumulation (Hallerberg et al. 2007, 2009; de Haan et al. 2013)2 as well as 
growth in public spending (Martin and Vanberg 2013). Much of the literature on budget procedures 
and fiscal policy concerns how centralized budget procedures reduce the effect of policymaker 
fractionalization on the growth of fiscal policy aggregates (Hallerberg et al. 2009; Wehner 2010; de 
Haan et al. 2013; Martin and Vanberg 2013). More centralized budget procedures should therefore 
mitigate the so-called common-pool problem of public finance (Weingast et al. 1981; Velasco 
2000), whereby fractionalization in the budget decision-making process (e.g., in the form of a 
multiplicity of ideologically distinct parties in government) leads to excessive public spending 
increases and, thus, larger public budget deficits and faster debt accumulation. 
 
                                                          
1 See Alesina et al. (1999) for a study of the effects of different budgetary institutions in Latin America. 
2 For exception to these findings, see Perotti and Kontopoulos (2002). 
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However, while the effect of more centralized and hierarchical budget institutions on government 
spending and government deficits seems established in the literature, the other central aspect of 
government finances—government revenue—has received much less attention. Much of the 
previous literature is based on the assumption that more centralized, hierarchical budget procedures 
affect government deficits by constraining public spending (Hallerberg et al. 2009, pp. 28‒34), but 
it does not address government revenue (neither empirically nor theoretically). 
 
This article argues that the centralization of the national budget procedure not only affects 
government spending, but also government revenue and, in line with the common-pool argument, 
that government fractionalization also matters for these dynamics. Since government coalition 
partners in a decentralized budget regime are incentivized to veto tax increases that 
disproportionally affect their constituencies, a more centralized regime, which strengthens the 
agenda-setting power of the finance minister, should lead to higher levels of national taxation for a 
given level of public expenditure, assuming that the finance minister wants to balance the public 
budget, and that his or her greater agenda-setting power makes it more difficult for individual 
cabinet members to veto tax increases that fall heavily on their own constituencies. 
 
Fixed-effects estimates in a panel of 15 European Union (EU) countries for which detailed 
budgetary process data exists strongly confirm that argument. More centralized budget procedures 
increase taxation as a share of the gross domestic product (GDP). Rather than being solely a tool for 
limiting government size, a more centralized budget procedure seems to reduce public budget 
deficits through both expenditure and revenue channels. The extent of the tax-increasing effect of 
budget centralization is contingent on both the type of budget centralization and government 
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fractionalization. In the case of budget centralization, which delegates budget procedure powers to 
the finance minister, greater government fractionalization actually increases the impact of budget 
centralization, as the status quo bias of increased veto-player fractionalization makes it more 
difficult to deviate from the finance minister’s preferred level of taxation. 
 
2. Theory: Government budget procedures and tax-setting 
The theoretical reasoning behind the argument that increased budget centralization increases the 
level of taxation is based on simple theory of government budgeting and the assumption that a 
finance minister3 is concerned with balancing the public budget. The theoretical argument is 
presented in non-formal terms below as well as in simple formalization (see Appendix A in the 
supplementary material). 
 
Consider a coalition government the members of which represent different constituencies (i.e., 
social groups and/or geographical units). The members are assumed to seek to advance the interests 
of their respective constituencies.4 When preparing the public budget, the members of government 
need to agree on sharing a fiscal burden in the form of taxation to finance already agreed increases 
in public spending, thereby achieving a more balanced budget. 
 
                                                          
3 Or the minister responsible for preparing and implementing the public budget.  
4 This can be represented as either an ideological preference for serving their constituency or an interest in securing 
future electoral support. 
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The fiscal burden can be spread over a number of tax instruments, each instrument affecting each 
coalition member’s constituency differently; property taxes disproportionally affect homeowners, 
taxes on agricultural land disproportionally affect farmers, payroll taxes disproportionally affect 
wage earners and so on. Even more general taxes (e.g., consumption taxes, income taxes) tend to be 
borne more by some groups than others. Consumption taxes tend to hit low-income households 
relatively heavily, whereas income taxes, which are progressive in almost all countries, 
disproportionally affect high-income households. Almost all of the types of taxation employed in 
modern states thus affect some societal groups disproportionally. 
 
In a non-hierarchical budgeting setting, changes to each type of taxation instrument—and therefore 
also tax increases—are decided individually. The government members must therefore agree on 
increases to each tax instrument to finance the budget. In this tax-setting situation, each government 
coalition member is incentivized to veto increases in the tax instruments that disproportionally 
affect their constituency. This dynamic will prevail even if each coalition member agrees that 
producing a certain amount of tax revenue is necessary, since it is possible to freeride on the 
taxation of the other coalition members’ constituencies. 
 
With a non-hierarchical or decentralized budget procedure, the increases in taxation will therefore 
be less than the agreed-to level of spending. The magnitude of this phenomenon increases as the 
coalition grows in number and each coalition partner represents a more exclusive constituency, 
since each tax instrument will affect each represented constituency more exclusively in the context 
of greater coalition fractionalization, while the opportunity to freeride the taxes levied on other 
coalition members’ constituencies also increases from the perspective of the individual coalition 
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member. Consequently, the level of taxation decreases as the number and diversity of the coalition’s 
members increase. This argument is similar to the classical common-pool approach to public 
finances, although it tends to focus on public spending as the relevant fiscal variable (Velasco 2000; 
Hallerberg et al. 2009, pp. 24‒28). 
 
In the case of a more centralized budget procedure, however, the coalition government is presented 
with a taxation package prepared by the finance minister that balances the level of public spending.5 
This assumes that the finance minister’s agenda-setting power over the public budget proposal—
and thus public expenditure—also translates into agenda-setting power over government revenue 
policies. The laws governing public revenues and public expenditures are obviously usually distinct, 
but the financing of existing and new public expenditure is usually part of the same process, at least 
in the budget preparation phase. Furthermore, in most developed democracies, the public tax 
administration and tax policy departments are part of the ministry of finance. Even in countries with 
a separate ministry of taxation (e.g., Denmark), the ministry of finance also oversees taxation policy 
and there is close coordination between the ministry of finance and the ministry of taxation, the 
former generally setting overall policy regarding taxation. 
 
So in a situation where the budget procedure is centralized and the finance minister is charged with 
presenting a comprehensive public budget proposal for the cabinet, changes to tax policies to 
finance new expenditure will usually accompany this proposal. The finance minister is, thus, the 
central and empowered agenda-setter regarding taxation policy in a centralized budget procedure. 
                                                          
5 The finance minister is implicitly assumed to be concerned with balancing the public budget. 
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In the case of this centralized budget procedure, the coalition members must now agree to remove 
increases in the different taxation instruments from the budget rather than agreeing to increase 
taxation via the different instruments. This dynamic will bias against tax cuts, since the government 
coalition members must now agree to remove already-proposed tax increases. This logic also 
extends to the legislative phase in the budget process, where tax levels will be higher the less 
individual legislative actors (e.g., support/opposition parties) are able or incentivized to remove new 
or existing taxation items from the budget. This can be achieved via amendment limits or the rule 
that the budget proposal is voted on as a whole. These dynamics mean that, ceteris paribus, greater 
centralization of the budget process will increase the level of taxation.6 Furthermore, greater 
coalition fractionalization in terms of the number of parties and ideological differences will increase 
the impact of budget centralization on taxation. Here, the status quo bias of greater veto-player 
distance within the government (Tsbelis 2002)7 will make it harder for the government to reach 
agreement on removing taxation items from the finance minister’s initial budget, which serves as 
the status quo budget. 
 
  
                                                          
6 This line of argument resembles a situation where the government has fiscal room to implement tax cuts. Here, 
coalition members are incentivized to maximize cuts to their constituencies’ tax payments while freeriding on the tax 
payments of other constituencies. This leads to a common-pool problem, where total taxes end up lower than 
planned. In contrast, the finance minister takes the total budget balance into account when deciding the tax cut for 
each tax instrument. Consequently, the tax raised from each instrument—and the total level of taxation—will be 
greater when the finance minister has greater agenda-setting power than in a decentralized budget regime. 
7 For a well-cited empirical study of the role of veto players in public budgets, see Tsebelis and Chang (2004). 
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This line of argument provides the basis for two hypotheses. 
H1: Further centralization of the budget process will increase the level of taxation. 
H2: The impact of the centralization of the budget process increases with the fractionalization of the 
government. 
 
The theoretical arguments above are similar to other models of fiscal policymaking in cabinets and 
the role of budgetary procedures (Hallerberg et al. 2009, pp. 24‒34). However, the arguments in this 
article add a new aspect to the role of budget centralization. While a more centralized budget 
procedure might reduce public spending, it might also increase taxation, as the finance minister, 
who is responsible for balancing the budget by moderating spending and increasing revenue, is 
empowered relative to the other cabinet members in a more centralized budget procedure. The next 
section describes the data used to test the above hypotheses. 
  
3. Data and estimation 
The dataset that forms the empirical basis of the test of the effect of budget centralization on the 
level of taxation consists of a panel of 15 EU countries8 covering the years 1990‒2008, where 
detailed data for the structure of the budget process exists. The central dependent level of interest is 
the level of taxation, which is measured as taxes as % of GDP. Obviously, this variable measures 
relative tax revenues rather than changes to official tax policy (e.g., tax laws). Comprehensive data 
on changes to tax legislation is not readily available, however, and changes to official tax rates 
                                                          
8 These are the “old” EU countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom. 
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might not always be fully representative of the actual taxes paid by citizens and companies 
(Slemrod 2004, pp. 1176‒1177). The theoretical argument made in this article—that centralizing 
the budget procedure increases the power of the finance minister, who is interested in balancing 
public revenue and expenditure—should also be more valid for actual tax revenues rather than 
official tax rates. So especially since controls of the state of the economy are included in the later 
statistical estimates, tax revenue as % of GDP should on average be able to capture differences in 
governments’ de facto tax policies in countries over time and be more closely linked to the 
theoretical argument. The taxation data is from the OECD database. 
 
To measure the level of budget centralization, I rely on Hallerberg et al. (2007, 2009), who have 
gathered detailed data on budgetary procedures and norms in the 15 EU countries. The data is based 
on three different surveys carried out in the early 1990s and 2000s (Hallerberg et al. 2009, pp. 56‒
57), and since the surveys record when changes to budgetary procedures are made, over-time 
variations in the budgetary procedures for the countries should be reflected in the data.9 I follow the 
classification suggested by these scholars and distinguish between delegation centralization and 
contracts centralization approaches when measuring budget centralization levels. 
 
Delegation centralization consists of three subcomponents related to the finance minister’s ability to 
control the budgetary process in the cabinet negotiation stage, the parliamentary stage and the 
budget implementation stage. Delegation centralization increases the more there are general budget 
                                                          
9 According to personal correspondence with one of the authors, the data most reliably captures actual budget 
practices and rules until the 2008 financial crisis, which is therefore the end year of the panel. Excluding the years 
after 2004 (the year of the last survey) from the analysis yields largely similar results. 
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constraints for the cabinet and the more the budget negotiation process assumes the form of a top-
down process with the finance minister as the central agenda-setter. The level of delegation 
centralization in the parliamentary stage increases the less able and incentivized the parliament is to 
introduce amendments to the initial budget proposal and if expenditures and the budget itself are 
voted on in one session. With respect to implementation delegation, centralization increases with 
the ability of the finance minister to control the other ministers in the budget execution phase. 
 
Contract delegation relates to the existence, time horizon and level of commitment to official fiscal 
targets that set guidelines for public expenditure development. The level of contracts centralization 
increases along with the length of the time horizon of the fiscal targets and the strength of the legal 
basis of these targets. The precise operationalizing of these variables is described in Hallerberg et 
al. (2009, pp. 52‒75).10 Both measures of budget centralization are scaled to run from 0 to 1, higher 
values denoting higher budget centralization levels. 
 
Especially delegation centralization fits the theoretical arguments for why increased budget 
centralization should increase taxation levels. However, the existence of longer term and more 
binding fiscal targets should also enable the finance minister to balance the budget via taxation 
increases. Since the finance minister in this type of budget centralization still serves an important 
function as the guardian of the fiscal contract (Hallerberg et al. 2009, p. 51), the finance minister 
                                                          
10 In this article, the delegation centralization index is equal to the authors’ Delegation Index, while the contract 
centralization index is equal to the Fiscal Targets (Long-Term) index (Hallerberg et al. 2009, p. 74). The authors also 
construct a full Contracts Index, which includes aspects of the budget implementation. Replacing the one type of 
contracts index with the other yields mostly similar results (results available upon request). 
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might argue that the removal of new taxation items by cabinet members and/or parliamentary actors 
would counteract the financing of the already-agreed-to levels of public spending established in the 
spending targets. This dynamic should also enable the finance minister to better introduce and 
implement tax increases with this type of budget centralization. 
 
The indexes themselves deal with the centralization of the overall budget process and tend to focus 
on public expenditures. As argued in the theoretical section, however, this general budget 
centralization should also spill over into greater centralization and agenda-setting power vis-à-vis 
tax policy. Furthermore, some of the subcomponents of the indexes deal specifically with the 
centralization of tax policy, such as the existence of targets for tax levels in the case of contracts 
centralization (Hallerberg et al. 2009, p. 60) and whether parliament must approve of additional 
government revenue to finance additional expenditure in the case of delegation centralization 
(Hallerberg et al. 2009, p. 64). The indexes should therefore also capture the centralization of the 
budget procedure regarding taxation decisions. 
 
The other central explanatory variable is the fractionalization of the incumbent government. To 
measure this, I rely on a measure of government fractionalization from the Database of Political 
Institutions. I use the variable checks, which is a continuous variable that increases by one for each 
additional party in the government coalition as long as the parties are needed to maintain a majority, 
and one for each member of the coalition that has an ideological position closer to the largest 
opposition party than the party of the chief executive (Cruz et al. 2016). This variable has the 
advantage of simultaneously measuring both the size and ideological fractionalization of the 
government. 
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Apart from these main explanatory variables, I employ a number of political controls that could 
affect both the level of taxation and the main explanatory variables. As political controls, I control 
for the occurrence of a legislative election to account for a potential electoral cycle in taxation using  
data from the Database of Political Institutions (Cruz et al. 2016). I also include the share of cabinet 
members from leftwing parties to control for a partisan effect on the level of taxation using data 
from the Comparative Political Dataset (Armingeon et al. 2015). A number of economic controls 
are also included. One is PPP-adjusted GDP per capita in constant prices from the OECD database. 
To control for the general state of the economy and as a measure of the state of the business cycle, I 
use GDP growth from the OECD Economic Outlook 98. The dependent variable is measured in % 
of GDP, so this control is necessary to ensure that a potential effect on tax levels is not due to 
changes in the denominator of the taxation variable. The state of the economy might also affect tax 
revenues, and increases or decreases in national income might be endogenous to changes in 
budgetary institutions. In the supplementary material (Appendix B), as an alternative measure of 
business cycle fluctuations, I use the output gap in % of potential GDP taken from the OECD 
Economic Outlook 101. The core results using this alternative measure of business cycle 
fluctuations are similar to the main analysis. 
 
Since the theoretical argument states that budget centralization will increase the level of taxation 
given the level of agreed upon government spending, I later include a control for the level of 
government spending measured by government outlays as % of GDP. The source for this variable is 
also the Comparative Political Dataset. Descriptive statistics can be found in Table 1. 
 
[Table 1 here] 
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The estimation method used to test the hypotheses is ordinary least square with both country- and 
years-fixed effects. The country-fixed effects enable me to hold country-specific characteristics 
constant and to analyze deviations in taxation levels from the country mean. The year-fixed effects 
help eliminate the potentially endogenous effect of a general trend toward higher levels of taxation 
and greater budget centralization in the analyzed period as well as a general trend in the other 
independent variables (e.g., GDP per capita). Standard errors are clustered at the country level to 
address autocorrelation issues. The estimate can be seen in equation 1, where countries are indexed 
by i and years by t. Budget centralization is the measure of budget centralization—either delegation 
or contracts—while Gov.frac. is the government fractionalization measure, which is interacted with 
the budget centralization measures in later specification in order to test Hypothesis 2. X is a vector 
of controls, while γt and δi are the year- and country-fixed effects, respectively. 
𝑇𝑎𝑥𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 = 𝛽1𝐵𝑢𝑑𝑔𝑒𝑡 𝑐𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐺𝑜𝑣. 𝑓𝑟𝑎𝑐.𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝛾𝑡 + 𝛿𝑖 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡 (1) 
 
4. Results 
The results of the main estimate, which tests Hypothesis 1, can be seen in Table 2. In columns 1 and 
2, taxation as % of GDP is regressed on the two measures of budget centralization without control 
for the level of public spending. Both of the budget centralization variables have the expected 
positive sign and non-trivial coefficient sizes. Going from the lowest to the highest positive level on 
the budget centralization indexes increases taxation levels by about three percentage points of GDP. 
However, only the contracts centralization measure is statistically significant at conventional levels. 
In columns 3 and 4, the level of government spending is added as a control in line with the 
theoretical argument that increased budget centralization increases tax levels while holding the level 
of public expenditure constant. In these estimates, the coefficient size of the delegation 
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centralization index increases to almost four percentage points of GDP, while the level of statistical 
significance increases to p < 0.05. The contracts centralization index decreases somewhat with the 
addition of the control of level of public expenditure but increases its level of statistical 
significance. These findings provide evidence in favor of the theoretical argument that, given the 
public expenditure level, the further centralization of the budget process increases the level of 
taxation. In short, substantial evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1 is found for the 15 EU countries. 
 
In line with the common-pool argument about taxation, government fractionalization has a 
statistically significant, negative effect on the level of taxation, whereas share of leftwing cabinet 
members has a significant, positive effect on tax levels in line with an expected partisan effect. The 
other control variables seem to affect the level of taxation negatively but are usually not statistically 
significant. 
[Table 2 here] 
 
4.1. Coalition dynamics 
Given the results in Table 2, there seems to be substantial evidence in favor of Hypothesis 1. To test 
Hypothesis 2 and explore the potential effect of the interaction between budget centralization and 
government fractionalization, government fractionalization and the two budget centralization 
indexes are interacted in Table 3 to test whether budget centralization reduces the fractionalization 
effect on the level of taxation. In column 1, the interaction between delegation centralization and 
government fractionalization has the expected positive sign, with a statistically significant effect (p 
< 0.10). In line with the theoretical argument, budget centralization, which makes the finance 
minister a more powerful agenda-setter and decision-maker in the budget process, increases in its 
effectiveness the more fragmented the cabinet is; presumably since higher fragmentation makes 
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deviation from the finance minister’s status quo agenda less likely. However, the interaction 
between contracts centralization and government fractionalization has a negative sign and is not 
statistically significant, while the constituting contracts centralization index still retains its positive 
and statistically significant effect. Contracts centralization increases the level of taxation given the 
public expenditure level but does not seem to become more effective with the increased 
fractionalization of the cabinet; if anything, the opposite seems to be the case. 
 
[Table 3 here] 
 
The effect of budget centralization contingent on government fractionalization is visualized in 
Figure 1. It again shows that the effect of delegation centralization on taxation levels becomes 
larger the more fragmented the government is, while contract centralization, if anything, becomes a 
less efficient way of increasing taxation levels when government fractionalization increases.   
 
 
[Figure 1 here] 
 
That the mediating effect of increased government fractionalization only seems to be present for 
delegation centralization might not be surprising, as this type of budget centralization actually best 
fits the theoretical model’s notion of budget centralization with a powerful, agenda-setting finance 
minister. Larger fractionalization of the government coalition should make it harder to agree to 
remove taxation items from the revenue side of the budget already prepared by the finance minister 
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when the finance minister has substantial power over the budget agenda and subsequent 
parliamentary and budget implementation procedures, which is the case for delegation 
centralization. Conversely, contracts centralization might have an overall effect on the level of 
taxation due to concerns within the government about not being able to balance the public budget 
given the fiscal targets,11 but this type of budget centralization does not become more efficient in 
raising taxation as government fractionalization increases. This is presumably because the effect of 
contracts centralization on taxation is not due to the finance minister’s hard agenda-setting power 
and control over the taxation status quo, which becomes harder to deviate from when government 
fractionalization is high. 
 
The dynamics of government fractionalization and type of budgetary institution thus seem reversed 
for taxation compared to public spending according to the arguments and findings of Hallerberg et 
al. (2009), where contracts centralization is a superior method for fiscal discipline when 
government fractionalization (in terms of the number of parties and ideology) is high and when 
coalition parties might risk running against each other in electoral campaigns (Hallerberg et al. 
2009, pp. 12‒51). However, the findings in Table 3 are in accordance with this article’s theoretical 
argument that the further fractionalization of the government coalition should make it harder to 
deviate from the finance minister’s preferred level of taxation, which serves as the status quo with 
high delegation centralization but not necessarily with high contracts centralization. 
                                                          
11 As previously mentioned, the finance minister might still play an important role as “guardian” of the fiscal targets 
and their implementation (Hallerberg et al. 2009, p. 51), which might also include working to raise taxes to meet the 
financing requirements of these fiscal targets. 
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These results suggest that budget procedures work differently for different types of fiscal policy. 
While the agenda-setting power of the finance minister regarding the total budget does indeed also 
appear to impact the level of taxation, unlike public debt accumulation (Hallerberg et al. 2009) and 
public spending (Martin and Vanberg 2013), a more powerful finance minister seems to increase 
rather than reduce the growth of this fiscal aggregate. This makes sense when assuming that the 
finance minister is focused on balancing the public budget, which can also be achieved via taxation 
increases. 
 
There is, thus, robust evidence in favor of Hypothesis 2 when budget centralization is measured as 
delegation centralization, which is also in line with the theoretical model. However, to check the 
sensitivity of the results to an alternative measure of government fractionalization, the checks 
variable is replaced in the supplementary material (Appendix C) with the well-known government 
Herfindahl index12 from the Database of Political Institutions. The government Herfindahl index is 
equal to the sum of the squared seat shares of the parties in government (Cruz et al. 2016). These 
results are largely similar to the results in Table 3. The moderating effect of government 
fractionalization on budget centralization thus seems to be robust to alternative measures13 of 
government fractionalization rather than a statistical artifact driven by the precise measurement of 
the checks variable. 
                                                          
12 The index goes from 0 to 1, lower scores denoting larger government fractionalization, which should be noted when 
interpreting the results in Appendix C. It is also necessary to note that the government Herfindahl index only measures 
government size fractionalization, not ideological distances within the government. 
13 The results are also similar if fractionalization is measured using the govfrac variable from the Database of Political 
Institutions, which measures the probability of two randomly picked government  deputies being from different 
parties (Cruz et al. 2016). Results available upon request. 
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4.2. Robustness tests 
The empirical analysis seems to support both Hypotheses 1 and 2, with the variation that only the 
effect of delegation centralization on taxation seems to increase with government fractionalization. 
However, concerns might be raised that the changes in budgetary procedures could be endogenous 
to other factors that might also affect taxation levels. One particularly concerning factor is that of 
European integration, which might matter for changes in budgetary procedures (Hallerberg et al. 
2009, pp. 124‒126) The introduction of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) might also have 
mattered for taxation levels due to the formal budget and government debt requirements in the 
Stability and Growth Pact. To address this issue, I redo the results from Tables 2 and 3 and include 
a control for whether the county is an EMU member (see Table 4). However, controlling for EMU 
membership does not change the core results from Tables 2 and 3. The EMU dummy itself does not 
seem to have any statistically significant impact on the level of taxation. The core results and the 
underlying theoretical argument about the link between budget centralization and tax levels still 
receive empirical support. 
 
[Figure 4 here] 
 
As an additional robustness test in Table 5, the main estimates are repeated with the addition of a 
control for gross government debt.14 Government fiscal crises, which are often precipitated by large 
government debt increases, have been found to be a predictor of government fiscal institutional 
reform (Hallerberg and Scartascini 2015). Furthermore, since taxes might be raised to consolidate 
public finances when government debt is high, the previously established relationship between 
                                                          
14 Source: the Comparative Political Dataset. 
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budget centralization and taxation might be endogenous to the level of government debt. However, 
adding the control for government debt in Table 5 changes neither the coefficient sizes, the 
statistical significance of the two centralization indexes nor their interaction with government 
fractionalization. 
 
[Table 5 here] 
 
The core results are apparently robust both to potential external and internal factors, which might be 
correlated with changes to fiscal institutions as well as the level of taxation. Hypotheses 1 and 2 and 
the underlying theoretical argument that budget centralization increases the level of taxation (and 
that government fractionalization might increase this effect), seem significantly strengthened. As a 
final sensitivity check, I address the issue of previous tax revenue levels. Tax systems and, thus, tax 
revenues generally tend to exhibit considerable inertia, so previous tax levels might influence 
current tax levels. However, including a lagged dependent variable with unit-fixed effects in such a 
relatively short panel might introduce risk of the so-called Nickell bias (Nickell 1981). Nonetheless, 
I rerun the full models from Tables 2 and 3 with a lagged dependent variable added to the estimates. 
These results can be found in the supplementary material (Appendix D). While there are some 
changes to the coefficient sizes of the central independent variables (which is hardly surprising 
given the loss of variance), the basic findings from the main analysis still receive support in these 
estimates. Greater centralization of the budget procedure, whether in the form of increased fiscal 
delegation to the finance minister or stronger fiscal contracts, increases taxation as % of GDP. This 
effect increases with government fractionalization for delegation centralization but not for contracts 
centralization. 
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5. Conclusion 
The effect of fiscal institutions, including budget procedures, is a large and growing field in the 
study of public finances and their political determinants. This article has brought the issue of 
different budget procedures to the area of taxation, where the effects of different budget procedures 
have not been studied. Building on a simple common-pool argument, the article argues that budget 
centralization increases the level of taxation given public spending, as a more centralized budget 
procedure strengthens the agenda-setting power of the finance minister and renders it harder for the 
cabinet and parliament to remove the tax increases presented to them. This dynamic should increase 
with the fractionalization of the cabinet. A panel analysis of 15 EU countries produces strong 
evidence in favor of this argument but also that the effect differs between types of budget 
centralization. Centralization of the budget procedure, which delegates significant power to the 
finance minister, increases the level of taxation given the public spending level, an effect that 
increases with government fractionalization. The use of more stringent fiscal targets as a type of 
budget centralization increases the level of taxation within countries, but government 
fractionalization does not make this type of budget centralization more efficient. 
 
The results of this article suggest that common-pool aspects of public finance and the effect of 
budget procedures in this area might differ between spending and revenue, which the previous 
literature on common-pool aspects of public finance has tended to underplay. The finding 
concerning the differences between types of budget centralization and their interplay with 
government fractionalization suggests that specific characteristics of the budget process might have 
great implications for whether and how veto-player dynamics affect public finance. Whether 
increased veto-player distance raises or reduces fiscal policy aggregates might depend on the 
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specific decision-making process and rules within the budgetary framework. As recent literature 
suggests (Hallerberg et al. 2009, pp. 38‒41; Bäck and Lindvall 2015), this might also depend on 
specific features of the veto players themselves, including whether coalition partners expect to be in 
office together again in the future.15 These issues possibly also affect taxation, where the taxation-
dampening effect of partisan fragmentation might be lower if parties expect to hold office together 
in the future. Future research might address these issues in greater detail and test whether, apart 
from fiscal policy, these dynamics might also be relevant for other aspects of government 
policymaking. 
 
The centralization of the budget process might indeed matter for public deficits and debt 
accumulation by constraining public spending (Martin and Vanberg 2013), but this article shows 
that the centralization of the budget process might also actually restrain government deficits and 
debt accumulation by increasing public revenues. Budget centralization might not unequivocally 
serve as a tool to limit government size, at least regarding public revenue. If longer-term budget and 
government credit constraint are hard, then countries running large deficits due to increases in 
unfinanced public spending might eventually have to cut spending. Countries with decentralized 
budget procedures might therefore have more volatile—but on average smaller—levels of taxation 
and public spending in the longer term, whereas countries with more centralized budget procedures 
might have slightly higher—albeit more stable—average levels of public spending and taxation. 
                                                          
15 New theoretical and empirical studies of veto-player dynamics, which consider issues of time-extended 
policymaking and credible commitments (Tommasi et al. 2014; Bäck and Lindvall 2015), also generate different or 
amended theoretical predictions vis-à-vis the effect of veto players on government policy stability and government 
fiscal policy. This article can be seen as yet another contribution to the amendment of the veto-player framework in 
budgetary politics. 
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Given that the budget procedures in European countries seem to have become more centralized 
(Hallerberg et al. 2009, p. 74), a trend that might have continued with stricter fiscal rules and 
procedures in the aftermath of the European debt crises in the 2010s (Lledó et al. 2017), European 
countries might be heading in this direction. Researchers and policymakers working with budget 
institutions might bear this in mind in future research and when assessing the impact and 
desirability of more centralized budget procedures. 
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Tables  
 
Table 1: Descriptive statistics  
Variable Mean  Std. Dev. Min Max Observations 
Taxation % of GDP 38.21 5.64 26.48 49.48 276 
Delegation centralization index 0.59 0.16 0.23 1 276 
Contracts centralization index  0.73 0.26 0 1 276 
Government fractionalization 4.41 1.38 2 10 276 
General government spending  % of GDP 47.49 7.01 31.08 70.21 276 
Legislative election 0.26 0.44 0 1 276 
Share of leftwing cabinet members 42.24 36.80 0 100 276 
GDP per capita constant US dollars  35,714.04 11,416.33 19,925 89,973 276 
GDP growth  2.69 2.25 ‒5.92 11 276 
 
Table 2: Budget centralization and taxation 
   (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  
Delegation centralization index 
3.108 
 (2.008) 
‒ 
3.808 
(1.771)** 
‒ 
Contracts centralization index ‒ 
3.033 
(1.210)** 
‒ 
2.500 
(0.840)*** 
General government spending % of GDP ‒ ‒ 
0.219 
(0.067)*** 
0.159 
(0.040)*** 
Government fractionalization 
‒0.483 
(0.221)** 
‒0.440 
(0.208)* 
‒0.409 
(0.181)** 
‒0.384 
(0.200)* 
Legislative election 
0.018 
(0.157) 
‒0.018 
(0.138) 
‒0.002 
(0.147) 
‒0.047 
(0.133) 
Share of leftwing cabinet members 
0.011 
(0.004)*** 
0.013 
(0.004)*** 
0.010 
(0.003)** 
0.011 
(0.003)*** 
GDP per capita constant prices 
‒0.000 
(0.000) 
‒0.000 
(0.000) 
‒0.000 
(0.000) 
‒0.000 
(0.000) 
GDP growth 
‒0.149 
(0.084)* 
‒0.122 
(0.091) 
‒0.057 
(0.092) 
‒0.053 
(0.093) 
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries  15 15 15 15 
Number of observations 276 276 276 276 
Within R-squared 0.30 0.39 0.42 0.45 
Dependent variable is taxation as % of GDP. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 3: Interaction with government fractionalization 
   (1)  (2) 
Delegation centralization index 
‒0.173 
(2.469) 
‒ 
Contracts centralization index ‒ 
4.825 
(2.229)** 
Government fractionalization 
‒0.951 
(0.385)** 
‒0.117 
(0.299) 
Delegation index × government fractionalization 
0.856 
(0.434)* 
‒ 
Contracts index × government fractionalization ‒ 
‒0.498 
(0.449) 
General government spending % of GDP 
0.239 
(0.066)*** 
0.148 
(0.037)*** 
Legislative election 
‒0.032 
(0.139) 
‒0.050 
(0.138) 
Share of leftwing cabinet members 
0.009 
(0.003)** 
0.011 
(0.003)*** 
GDP per capita constant prices 
‒0.000 
(0.000) 
‒0.000 
(0.000) 
GDP growth 
‒0.068 
(0.087) 
‒0.062 
(0.093) 
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes 
Number of countries 15 15 
Number of observations 276 276 
Within R-squared 0.43 0.46 
Dependent variable is taxation as % of GDP. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. 
 *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 4: Control for EMU membership 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Delegation centralization index 
3.729 
(1.664)** 
‒ 
‒0.570 
(2.216) 
‒ 
Contracts centralization index ‒ 
2.439 
(0.797)*** 
‒ 
4.859 
(2.241)** 
Government fractionalization 
‒0.413 
(0.182)** 
‒0.387 
(0.199)* 
‒0.997 
(0.381)** 
‒0.109 
(0.302) 
Delegation index × government fractionalization ‒ ‒ 
0.922 
(0.410)** 
‒ 
Contracts index × government fractionalization ‒ ‒ ‒ 
‒0.520 
(0.448) 
General government spending % of GDP 
0.225 
(0.068)*** 
0.165 
(0.042)*** 
0.246 
(0.067)*** 
0.154 
(0.039)*** 
Legislative election 
0.001 
(0.146) 
‒0.043 
(0.131) 
‒0.030 
(0.138) 
‒0.046 
(0.135) 
Share of leftwing cabinet members 
0.009 
(0.003)** 
0.011 
(0.003)** 
0.008 
(0.003)** 
0.011 
(0.003)*** 
GDP per capita constant prices 
‒0.000 
(0.000) 
‒0.000 
(0.000) 
‒0.000 
(0.000) 
‒0.000 
(0.000) 
GDP growth  
‒0.054 
(0.094) 
‒0.050 
(0.094) 
‒0.065 
(0.088) 
‒0.060 
(0.095) 
EMU 
‒0.558 
(0.517) 
‒0.436 
(0.557) 
‒0.636 
(0.476) 
‒0.496 
(0.584) 
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries 15 15 15 15 
Number of observations 276 276 276 276 
Within R-squared 0.43 0.46 0.44 0.47 
Dependent variable is taxation as % of GDP. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Table 5: Control for government debt 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Delegation centralization index 
3.711 
(1.795)* 
‒ 
‒0.947 
(2.886) 
‒ 
Contracts centralization index ‒ 
2.460 
(0.793)*** 
‒ 
4.816 
(2.209)** 
Government fractionalization 
‒0.402 
(0.182)** 
‒0.378 
(0.196)* 
‒1.019 
(0.396)** 
‒0.106 
(0.303) 
Delegation index × government fractionalization ‒ ‒ 
0.983 
(0.494)* 
‒ 
Contract index × government fractionalization ‒ ‒ ‒ 
‒0.506 
(0.452) 
General government spending % of GDP 
0.206 
(0.058)*** 
0.148 
(0.039)*** 
0.216 
(0.053)*** 
0.135 
(0.038)*** 
Legislative election 
‒0.001 
(0.148) 
‒0.044 
(0.135) 
‒0.033 
(0.140) 
‒0.047 
(0.140) 
Share of leftwing cabinet members 
0.010 
(0.003)** 
0.012 
(0.003)*** 
0.009 
(0.003)** 
0.011 
(0.003)*** 
GDP per capita constant prices 
‒0.000 
(0.000) 
‒0.000 
(0.000) 
‒0.000 
(0.000) 
‒0.000 
(0.000) 
GDP growth 
‒0.067 
(0.085) 
‒0.061 
(0.092) 
‒0.087 
(0.080) 
‒0.073 
(0.091) 
Gross government debt 
0.006 
(0.016) 
0.005 
(0.011) 
0.011 
(0.017) 
0.006 
(0.011) 
Country-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year-fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Number of countries 276 276 276 276 
Number of observations 15 15 15 15 
Within R-squared 0.42 0.45 0.44 0.47 
Dependent variable is taxation as % of GDP. Country-clustered standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01. 
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Figures  
Figure 1: The effect of centralization contingent on government fractionalization 
a: Delegation centralization b. Contracts centralization 
  
Note: Outer lines show 90%. confidence intervals. 
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